33 Minutes » Baker Spring

State Department Pushback on Washington Post Story

La Shawn — Mon, 02 Aug 2010 18:18:08 +0000

According to a Washington Post story published last week, the State Department reported that Russia is violating international chemical and biological weapons pacts. An excerpt:

“The new compliance report, obtained by the Washington Post, says that several issues raised in the 2005 version have been resolved, on subjects such as the movement of Russian road-mobile missiles and inspection of reentry vehicles. But the report may nonetheless fuel the debate over the new treaty, because it says a number of other compliance issues remained unresolved when the treaty expired last December. The unclassified version of the report does not identify them. To pass, the treaty will need at least eight Republican votes plus those of all 57 Democrats and the two independents. Most Republicans haven’t yet indicated which way they will go. In recent weeks, the battle over the treaty has intensified, with the Heritage Foundation launching a nationwide campaign against it, and former presidential candidate Mitt Romney branding it Obama’s ‘worst foreign policy mistake.”

The Heritage Foundation’s Baker Spring comment on the issue:

“The State Department is sorely upset about July 28 headlines in the Washington Post and the Washington Times about a recent Department report on Russian noncompliance with several existing and past arms control treaties and how the Russian record could derail Senate approval of the new arms control treaty with Russia , which is called New START. It seems, however, that the State Department cannot keep its story straight.

“According to a report in Foreign Policy’s online journal “The Cable,” Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller asserts that Russian non-compliance with New START’s predecessor treaty, simply called START, was about minor technical issues. On the other hand, a State Department official speaking off the record is quoted as saying, “As far as State is concerned, cheating in any form would be a huge issue… so it absolutely would be something we would take very seriously.”

“So which is it?”

Baker Spring: Missile Defense and Disarmament Commonalities

La Shawn — Mon, 02 Aug 2010 18:15:15 +0000

Cross posted from The Daily Caller:

Responding to James Carafano’s July 29 critique of New START, William Hartung asserts that the proposed nuclear arms treaty imposes no limitations on U.S. missile defense options. It’s a faithful parroting of the administration line. But given Hartung’s longstanding views regarding missile defense, arms control and nuclear disarmament, this argument—coming from him—is quite disingenuous.

Should New START enter into force, it is a virtual certainty that—excepting only the government of Russia—Hartung would be the first in line to state that improving U.S. missile defense capabilities is incompatible with the terms of the treaty. His argument that New START imposes no restrictions on missile defense is only a temporary—and rather transparent—expedient to encourage Senate ratification of the treaty.

At the heart of the debate over missile defense and New START is the language in its preamble. This language prohibits defensive capabilities that have the potential to undermine the “viability and effectiveness” of Russia’s strategic nuclear force. Hartung argues that language in the preamble is not legally binding. That’s highly questionable. But even if true, the language is certainly morally and politically binding.

There’s also the problem of imprecision. The meaning of the phrase “viability and effectiveness” depends on circumstance and is in the eye of the beholder. For example, if the Russians decide to predicate their strategic nuclear force on the basis of a first strike option, they may freely claim that U.S. missile defense capabilities undermine the viability and effectiveness of its strategic nuclear force. After all, nothing complicates first strike options like effective missile defense.

More likely, the Russians will argue that U.S. missile defenses jeopardize its retaliatory (“second strike”) strategic nuclear capability. The central purpose of such a strike would be to kill as many Americans as possible. Hartung would agree with a Russian assertion that its strategic nuclear force exists to provide a second strike option. How, then, can he oppose defending the American people, and by extension America’s allies, against a nuclear strike by Russia or any other nuclear-armed state?

There is no good answer to this question. While he and Carafano clearly disagree about many issues related to arms control, there is one thing they should agree on: the inappropriateness and ineffectiveness of a second strike nuclear deterrence policy.

It is surprising and disturbing that Hartung of all people takes refuge in the argument for a strategic posture that gives both the U.S. and Russia nuclear forces large enough “for either side to destroy the other many times over.” It’s even more disturbing when you consider that the U.S. must deter potential aggression not just—or even primarily—from Russia, but from an increasing number of newly-armed nuclear states as well. It falls in the category of small favors, one presumes, that Hartung stops short of applying the logic of second strike deterrence to nuclear-armed terrorists. In this case, at least, he appears not to object to defensive options.

Hartung ought to try the following thought experiment on for size. What if New START’s preamble made the following statement: “Mindful of the fact that nuclear disarmament is incompatible with strategic stability because it will undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties….”

Both robust strategic defenses, including missile defenses, and nuclear disarmament are incompatible with second-strike deterrence postures. That this language is not in the preamble demonstrates only that Hartung’s disingenuousness regarding New START restrictions imposed on the U.S. missile defense program is matched by the Russian government’s disingenuousness regarding the matter of nuclear disarmament.

– Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.

Kim Holmes: Show START Records

La Shawn — Thu, 27 May 2010 12:20:02 +0000

Last week we mentioned that the U.S. Senate was deliberating on whether to ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The Heritage Foundation’s Baker Spring said treaty approval “will turn on whether the Obama Administration’s commitment to modernizing the nuclear weapons infrastructure is adequate in the eyes of the Senate and will be sustained after ratification.” (Source)

If the administration provides no clear-cut answers, the Senate may request the negotiating records between the two countries. The Heritage Foundation’s Kim Holmes provides an update on those negotiations. From the Washington Times:

“The Obama administration’s drive to win Senate approval of the New START arms treaty with Russia has hit a speed bump. Several senators are asking to see the secret negotiating record from the administration’s official talks with Russia.

“Why? Because U.S. and Russian officials publicly disagree about what the treaty says. Senators have a right to know – before they consent to ratification of a treaty that affects national security – how those terms now at issue were handled during the negotiations.”

“The differences regarding missile defense are stark. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asserts that the treaty links arms reduction to restraint on missile defense and that this linkage is legally binding. Russia, he says, can withdraw from the treaty if ‘the U.S.’s build-up of its missile defense strategic potential in numbers and quality begins to considerably affect the efficiency of Russian strategic nuclear forces.’”

One side claims there are no restrictions on our missile defense strategy, and the other side believes there are restrictions. Which is it?

“Only a careful review of the negotiating record can set the record straight,” Holmes writes. The president has undermined our defenses and emboldened a resurgent Russia for “the sake of just getting a treaty.”

The U.S. Senate Gets START

La Shawn — Tue, 18 May 2010 13:19:09 +0000

The U.S. Senate took up the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) this week. While the Obama administration hopes the Senate will ratify the treaty without a protracted process, missile defense advocates hope senators will ask the right questions and proceed only when they’ve received the answers.

Last month, the U.S. and Russia agreed to reduce deployed warheads to between 1,550, and limit intercontinental ballistic missiles to 700. Shortly after they reached the agreement, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said if “the U.S.’s build-up of its missile defense strategic potential in numbers and quality begins to considerably affect the efficiency of Russian strategic nuclear forces,” Russia would back out of the treaty.

The Heritage Foundation’s Baker Spring says START approval “will turn on whether the Obama Administration’s commitment to modernizing the nuclear weapons infrastructure is adequate in the eyes of the Senate and will be sustained after ratification.” (Source)

If the administration provides no clear-cut answers, the Senate may request the negotiating record between the two countries. We’re naturally curious about whatever compromises the president made during his wrangling with the former Soviet Union.

“If a cohesive minority in the Senate can effectively challenge the Obama Administration on New START, even if the Treaty is ultimately approved by the Senate,” Spring writes, “the rest of the Obama Administration’s arms control agenda will be subject to more serious scrutiny.”

Baker Spring on START

La Shawn — Tue, 30 Mar 2010 16:37:09 +0000

An excerpt from The START Follow-on Treaty: Questions the Senate Needs to Ask:

On April 8, President Obama and Russian President Dmitri Mevedev are scheduled to sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on treaty in Prague. The new treaty will require each side to reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 and the number of strategic nuclear missile launchers and bombers to 800.

Regardless of whether a particular Senator views this new treaty sympathetically or not, all Senators should agree on at least one point: The ratification and entry into force of this treaty will have profound implications for the security of the United States. Accordingly, Senators will need to ask some probing questions about the treaty in the coming weeks and months.

1. Does the Treaty, Either Directly or Indirectly, Limit the Missile Defense Options of the U.S.?

The fact sheet released by the White House describing the content of the treaty in general terms states that the treaty places no constraints on the U.S. regarding missile defenses. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, however, begs to differ. He has stated that if the U.S. exceeds current levels of missile defense systems, then the new treaty will cease to have force. Lavrov also asserts that the limitations on strategic defenses take a legally binding form under the treaty.

Even if this is not the case—and that cannot be certain until the text of the treaty is released—informal linkages to missile defense from the treaty can, as a practical matter, be just as limiting as actual text in the treaty. For example, President Obama established precisely such a linkage by canceling a plan to field defensive interceptors against long-range missiles in Poland and associated radar in the Czech Republic last September.

2. Does the Treaty Limit U.S. Conventional Strategic Strike Systems?

Again, the White House fact sheet says no. The White House assertion is difficult to fathom, however, because the fact sheet states that the treaty will limit both deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers at 800. Thus, such launchers would seem to be applicable against the numerical limit—whether or not they are armed with nuclear warheads.

If launchers are subject to the numerical limitation regardless, then the treaty by definition imposes a limitation on U.S. options for fielding conventional strategic strike systems.

MEADS Update

La Shawn — Wed, 17 Mar 2010 12:17:02 +0000

Last week, we blogged about the conflict between the Pentagon and the Army regarding the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). The Pentagon wants to continue developing the system with Germany and Italy, and the Army wants to ditch the project, citing the system’s cost. MEADS is a mobile system designed to intercept short-range cruise missiles and shoot down planes and drones. The system uses Lockheed Martin’s Patriot PAC-3 missile and the long-range IRIS-T air-to-air missile.

The $19 billion MEADS project began over 10 years ago, and it’s intended to replace the Army’s aging Patriot system. In addition to the system’s cost, says the Army, it’s taking too long to build it, and it will be hard to manage. The Army will decide whether to transfer development of MEADS to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

The Defense Department was also concerned about souring relations with Germany and Italy if MEADS is canceled. The Heritage Foundation’s Baker Spring said the system is one that the U.S., Germany, and Italy can use when each has the need. “It’s almost inconceivable to me that the U.S. military would be in an expeditionary operation where it won’t be working with coalition partners in some form or another,” he told the Washington Post.

Defense News reports that Army officials and MDA representatives met last week, but the two did not reach a decision on MEADS. Officials agreed that before they can decide whether to transfer the system from the Army to the MDA, follow-up questions and more analysis were necessary.

A design review of MEADS is scheduled for August 2010.

Battle Over the Medium Extended Air Defense System

La Shawn — Tue, 09 Mar 2010 14:09:05 +0000

The Pentagon wants the U.S. to continue developing the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), in conjunction with Germany and Italy, but the Army wants to ditch the project, citing the system’s cost. (Source)

MEADS is a mobile system designed to intercept short-range cruise missiles and shoot down planes and drones.

The $19 billion MEADS project, which began over 10 years ago, is intended to replace the Army’s aging Patriot system. In addition to the system’s cost, says the Army, it’s taking too long to build it, and it will be hard to manage. The Pentagon wants to continue building the system and has requested $467 million. At this point, it would cost more money to cancel the project than to continue. The Defense Department would owe contractors, a group that includes Lockheed Martin, at least half a million in penalties.

The Defense Department is also concerned about souring relations with Germany and Italy if MEADS is canceled. The Washington Post quotes the Heritage Foundation’s Baker Spring. He said the system is one that the U.S., Germany, and Italy can use when each has the need.

“It’s almost inconceivable to me that the U.S. military would be in an expeditionary operation where it won’t be working with coalition partners in some form or another,” Spring told the Post.

The Army will decide whether to transfer development of MEADS to the Missile Defense Agency. Understandably, Lockheed Martin wants to continue developing the system. “At a time of growing threats, MEADS represents the United States’ first all-new air and missile defense system of its kind in decades and is the only such program in which allies are sharing the cost to develop a capability that each country needs.”

The Army and the Pentagon are in a conundrum. MEADS would provide protection in the field, and canceling it would cost more than keeping it. More than that, dropping the system likely would displease Germany and Italy.

(Image source: Army Technology)

Baker Spring on Electromagnetic Pulse

La Shawn — Thu, 04 Mar 2010 12:22:18 +0000

In 2004, the congressionally mandated Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack released an unclassified executive report on its broader study of the U.S.’s vulnerability to EMP weapons strikes.[1] In 2008, the commission released a follow-up report that detailed the vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructures of the U.S. to EMP strikes.[2] Taken together, these two reports make it clear that an EMP attack could inflict severe damage on the U.S. As the initial report stated, “EMP is one of a small number of threats that can hold our society at risk of catastrophic consequences.”

Congress should not let the Obama Administration ignore the commission’s findings. Instead, it should mandate an updated assessment of which countries may be pursuing EMP weapons and associated delivery systems and platforms. Further, Congress should demand that the Administration develop, test, and ultimately field defenses against EMP attacks, including improved ballistic missile defenses capable of countering short-range ballistic missiles that can carry EMP warheads.

What Is EMP?

EMP is triggered by the detonation of a nuclear weapon at a high altitude over the earth. As a result of this detonation, an electromagnetic field radiates down to the earth, creating electrical currents.

These fields cause widespread damage to electrical systems–the lifeblood of a modern society like the U.S. In turn, the damaged electronic systems can cause a cascade of failures throughout the broader infrastructure, including banking systems, energy systems, transportation systems, food production and delivery systems, water systems, emergency services, and–perhaps most damaging–cyberspace.

Effectively, the U.S. would be thrown back to the pre-industrial age following a widespread EMP attack.

What Congress Should Do

The lack of public awareness regarding the disturbing implications of an EMP attack may prompt the Obama Administration to set aside proposals for addressing this problem. Congress should not let this happen. Specifically, Congress should take the following three steps:

Step No. 1: Require the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to Produce a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Describing Which Countries Are Capable of Launching an EMP Strike. The NIE should review not only the weapons systems themselves but the delivery systems and platforms capable of carrying the weapons. Additionally, Congress should obtain from the NIE the intelligence community’s assessment of how EMP-capable countries are incorporating those weapons into their broader military strategies.

The latter assessment would permit the President and his advisors to determine how the U.S. could respond to EMP threats as they arise. Such planning is an essential part of providing an effective defense against these threats.

***

Read the full web memo at Heritage.org.

Baker Spring on FY2011 Defense Budget Cuts

La Shawn — Thu, 25 Feb 2010 11:49:17 +0000

On February 1, 2010, the Obama Administration released its defense budget proposal as part of its fiscal year (FY) 2011 budget request.[1] The defense budget proposal contains three components:

• A $33 billion supplemental appropriation to support overseas contingency operations (OCO) during the current fiscal year;
• A detailed FY 2011 budget request for the core defense program and OCO funding; and
• An outline of defense spending levels for FY 2010 through FY 2015.

The Administration proposes spending $738.7 billion on defense in FY 2011: $159.3 billion on OCO and $579.4 billion on the core defense program. The Administration’s proposal lacks a detailed description of the spending projections for FY 2012 through FY 2015, except that it estimates annual OCO spending at $50 billion annually.

The most important of the proposal’s three components is the spending outline for FY 2010 through FY 2015 because it reveals the future trend of the overall defense budget. This trend line clearly shows that the resources provided to the military will not be sufficient to maintain America’s long-standing security commitments to the American people and to U.S. allies and friends. These commitments include, for example, defending the American people against attack, preserving freedom of the high seas, and preventing a hostile power from dominating Europe.

Congress has a constitutional duty to use its power of the purse to fill the gaps that the Obama Administration’s defense budget would otherwise expose.

A Delayed Draconian Cut

Under the Obama Administration’s current budget outline, total defense spending is expected to decline from $722.1 billion in FY 2010 to $698.2 billion (in current dollars) in FY 2015. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), total defense spending would fall from about 4.9 percent in FY 2010 to roughly 3.6 percent in FY 2015. (See Chart 1.)

In 2009, the Obama Administration’s budget outline had recommended a draconian cut in the FY 2011 defense budget. The good news is that the Administration has flinched, proposing a FY 2011 budget of $738.7 billion–$118 billion more that it had proposed in last year’s budget. The bad news is that this merely delays the draconian cut. Under the budget outline in the FY 2011 budget, the FY 2012 defense budget would drop roughly $92 billion below the proposed FY 2011 level. This cut is the most important factor contributing to the negative trend of defense spending declining as a percentage of GDP.

This planned cut directly affects the core defense program, which funds the military capabilities needed to uphold U.S. security commitments into the future. The core defense program is slated to decline from 3.8 percent of GDP in FY 2010 to less than 3.4 percent in FY 2015. (See Chart 1.) According to the Administration’s budget outline of a year ago, the core defense budget will continue declining after FY 2015, approaching 3 percent of GDP by FY 2019.

Read the full text of Baker Spring’s article at Heritage.

Baker Spring on MEADS Program

La Shawn — Tue, 18 Aug 2009 12:56:55 +0000

The Heritage Foundation’s Baker Spring has written a web memo titled, “Sustain the Other European Missile Defense Program,” in which he discusses the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) development program.

President Obama appears reluctant to support agreements we made with Poland and the Czech Republic to build missile defense shields, and he’s proposed to cut $1.4 billion from the missile defense program. But what about our joint missile program with Germany and Italy? An excerpt:

“The Germans are covering 25 percent of the cost of the program, while the Italians are covering 16.7 percent. The U.S. is responsible for the remaining 58.3 percent. This cost-sharing arrangement is based on a $3.4 billion contract that was signed by the three countries in 2004.

“The Obama Administration requested a little more than $569 million in research, development, test, and evaluation funding for the program for fiscal year 2010.Generally speaking, Congress is on track to support the Administration’s request. The question is whether the Obama Administration and Congress will support the program in the years after fiscal year 2010. Therefore, Congress should express its desire to see this program continue in fiscal year 2011 and beyond.”

Spring adds that the MEADS program should stay on track. Not only will it reinforce our commitments with Europe, it will ensure mobility of missile defense power for ground forces, 360-degree protection against missile and air threats, and more.

Read the full article here.

(Image source: Army Technology)