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On the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, Iran announced that it was now a nuclear state, capable of enriching higher levels of uranium. The rogue nation recently announced plans to build two more uranium enrichment sites, although it still claims the nuclear enrichment is for peaceful and scientific purposes.

Despite these developments, Iran stated in a document reportedly seen by news organizations that it’s ready to give up most of its stockpile of enriched uranium in a simultaneous exchange for fuel rods, and the exchange must take place on its territory. The U.N. has rejected this offer. Under the International Atomic Energy Agency’s terms, Iran would hand over the uranium and wait up to a year to receive fuel rods.

China and Russia both refuse to support further sanctions against Iran and claim to seek a diplomatic solution.

Meanwhile, Iran revealed plans to build 10 more nuclear enrichment plans, including the two previously mentioned. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed an energy embargo against Iran, with or without the U.N.’s approval.

How will the U.S. respond?

General David Petraeus said on “Meet the Press” that given our attempts to resolve differences with Iran diplomatically, the U.S. can “now to go on what is termed the pressure track. That’s the course on which we are embarked now.” He added that the administration will “send the kind of signal to Iran about the very serious concerns that the countries in the region and, indeed, the entire world have… about Iran’s activities in the nuclear program.”

Talking tough is one thing; following it up with action is another. What will this “pressure track” against Iran entail? The U.S. has already given Iran too wide a berth. While we’re trying to be diplomatic, Iran is enriching more uranium and building more nuclear sites.

Last week, the Heritage Foundation’s James Carafano wrote at National Journal Online that we can speed up the process of freedom in Iran and contain nuclear proliferation by adopting “tough unilateral sanctions that hit the regime in the gut.” He added that the president needs to “spare no effort to shame Iran for its horrific human rights record, and…put the ‘third site’—the deployment of missile defense to Poland and the Czech Republic–back on the table. Take out every avenue Tehran has to threaten the West.”

(Sources: Reuters and AFP)

In his recent Washington Examiner column, the Heritage Foundation’s James Carafano recounts the successful Airborne Laser (ABL) test that occurred earlier this month. Within two minutes of launching, the high-energy laser found its target and destroyed it.

“Not bad for a defensive weapon once ridiculed as science fiction,” Carafano writes. “Skeptics even persuaded the Obama administration to slot the airborne laser for the ninth circle of procurement hell — a pit for dead-end research and development programs. But this month’s dramatic success has put the critics on their heels…The Point Mugu exercise was what engineers call a ‘proof of principle’ test. They tested it. It is proven.”

Despite the ABL’s success, the Obama administration opted not to build a second test aircraft. Why? “It will argue laser missile defense makes no sense because the weapon’s range is limited to a few hundred kilometers. That would put the lumbering aircraft well within the range of air defense systems fielded by the likes of North Korea and Iran.”

But shorter-range Scud missiles, however, are threats that the ABL can counter. The former Soviet Union made these missiles, and today other countries make their own. Carafano notes that Iran’s Shahab-3 is an advanced Scud variant probably capable of traveling 1,000 kilometers and carrying a warhead.

“It couldn’t reach Washington from Tehran, but then, it wouldn’t have to. Iran could easily extend the missile’s reach simply by moving it to a commercial freighter and firing it from nearby using an improvised vertical launch tube disguised as cargo.”

Is this something worth worrying about? Please post a comment at the Washington Examiner.

In response to U.S. plans to deploy missile defense shields to Poland and the Czech Republic, Russia threatened to send short-range Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad, near the Polish border. After President Barack Obama took office, Russia rescinded the threat.

It was speculated that Russia changed its mind because the Obama administration seemed to be taking an appeasement approach in exchange for the former Soviet Union’s help with Iran.

That help never panned out. In fact, Russia made a deal to sell S-300 missiles to Iran, and has refused to issue tougher sanctions against the country, even as Iran announced its intend to develop high-grade nuclear fuel and enrich more uranium.

No doubt Russia hoped the Obama administration would put missile deployment to Eastern and Central Europe on hold. Those hopes were dashed. Not only is the U.S. deploying shields to Poland and Romania, it plans to beef up missile defense in the Persian Gulf.

According to Reuters, it looks like the Iskander threat is back in play.

Transdniestria, a region of Moldova, said it’s open to hosting Russian missiles “As far as the Iskander…is concerned,” said leader Igor Smirnov, “we have long said we are ready.”

Moldava’s acting president rejected that claim, however, calling Transdniestria “an artificial creation” with no authority to speak for relations between Moldova and Russia.

But what does Russia say?

In 2008, Russia denied a deal to sell S-300 missiles to Iran, a rogue state sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council for refusing to suspend uranium enrichment. A Russian arms-export monopoly denied knowledge of such a sale. Although a Russian foreign ministry spokesman said there was no S-300 missile sale and referred to Iran as “unstable” in 2008, Russia has refused to join us in calling for tougher sanctions against Iran and said, presumably with a straight face, that there’s no “military element” to Iran’s uranium enrichment.

Fast forward to 2010, and Russia has since come clean and confessed to the S-300 deal with the “unstable” Iran. Earlier this month, Iran accused Russia of stalling on delivering the weapons. According to Reuters, Russia’s Security Council denied this accusation.

Security Council deputy secretary Vladimir Nazarov said, “There is a signed contract…which we must implement, but deliveries have not started yet. This deal is not restricted by any international sanctions, because the talk is about deliveries of an exclusively defensive weapon.”

Is it possible Russia has no intention of delivering the weapons, and the arms sale agreement is Russia’s leverage against the U.S.?

The deputy secretary warned the U.S. and Israel not to preemptively strike Iran, “a neighbor of Iran.” Is Russia concerned about stopping Iran’s nuclear program or helping Iran maintain the program for its own interests? Russia is selling so-called defensive weapons to an unstable country that has Israel in its sights, and refuses to agree on stronger sanctions. After denying the deal to sell S-300s, Russia has gone on record and admitted the deal.

From where we’re sitting, Russia seems more interested in aiding Iran than containing Iran.

(Image source: Getty Images)

For the last couple of weeks, Iran has been promising to “stun” the West on February 11, anniversary of the Islamic revolution, as it continues developing nuclear capabilities in defiance of the U.S. and other world powers.

This threat comes on the heels of Iran’s announcement that it will produce higher-grade uranium for a nuclear reactor. Despite denials, Iran clearly is on the road to nuclear weapons.

The U.S. and other countries likely will push for tougher sanctions. So far, Russia has refused to impose stronger sanctions against Iran. Russia’s reticence at this point is particularly odd. Nikolai Patrushev, Russian secretary of the United Nations Security Council, said the West’s concerns about the rogue state’s nuclear program are well founded, and despite Iran’s words, its actions “raise doubts in other countries and those doubts are quite valid.” (Reuters)

The understatement of the decade.

Iran’s actions speak louder than anything its leaders have to say. In addition to uranium enrichment, for example, the country plans to build unmanned aircraft designed to attack and conduct surveillance. Iran’s opened two new missile production plants to make ground-to-air missiles, and its ambassador in Moscow said Russia intends to deliver S-300s to Iran, part of a deal brokered in 2007. We mentioned last year that Russia denied entering into such a deal.

It’s a vicious circle. Russia is using Iran as leverage against our country’s missile defense program in Eastern and Central Europe and START re-negotiations. In turn, the Iranian threat influences our missile defense strategy, and we increase deployment of missiles to the region, which angers Russia. And on and on.

Last week, Romania agreed to host missile interceptors (Standard Missile 3) as part of the president’s new missile defense plan. These missiles will be in place to defend against attacks from Iran, but once again, Russia believes their purpose is offensive. (UPI)

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the U.S. broke its promise to keep the Kremlin abreast of its missile defense developments in the region, and NATO representative Dmitri Rogozin asked, “How can we stay calm when alien military infrastructure, U.S. military infrastructure, has come to the Black Sea area?”

How will our missile defense plans in Romania affect negotiations for the START renewal? “It is impossible to talk seriously about a reduction of nuclear capabilities when a nuclear power is working to deploy defensive systems against nuclear warheads possessed by other countries,” Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said.

The missile interceptors will be deployed to Romania by 2015. Obviously, these and other developments will impact START negotiations, giving Russia an excuse to stall. Earlier this month, Poland announced that the U.S. will deploy Patriot missiles to Poland near the Russian border. In response, the former Soviet Union announced it would beef up its Baltic fleet. Signed in November, the deal between the U.S. and Poland also sends about 100 U.S. troops to Poland.

(Source for all quotes: UPI)

What’s the rush? asks Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and a member of the congressionally mandated Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism.

The U.S. has several nuclear arms containment options, so why rush to renew the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and allow Russia to dictate our missile defense policy?

Last month, the U.S. and Russia agreed to honor the spirit of the expired START, as they continue to negotiate a replacement Under the treaty, signed by Russia and the U.S. in 1991, both countries agreed to reduce nuclear warheads to roughly 6,000 and delivery vehicles to 1,600. Eleven years later, the Moscow Treaty, a follow-up to START, required warhead reductions to between 1,700 and 2,200.

Russia blamed our plans to continue developing a comprehensive missile defense system for the renewal delay. Sokolski, writing at National Review Online:

“The odds of START’s being ratified before November’s elections are hardly on the rise. The next round of negotiations begins today in Geneva…As it is, 41 Senators (all 40 Republicans plus one independent, Sen. Joe Lieberman) have warned President Obama that they are in no mood to approve START unless the White House supports a ’significant’ nuclear-weapons-modernization program. The Defense Department’s Nuclear Posture Review, which details U.S. nuclear-weapons requirements for Congress every five years, was due in December. The administration is divided and has asked for two extensions; the review is now due in March and may be delayed again. Complicating matters even further, Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin is pushing to link missile defenses with offensive missiles in START, a potential killer provision for most pro-missile-defense Republicans.”

Senior officials in the administration are keen to “show progress” with Russia, in light of the mid-term elections. They may resubmit a Bush-era nuclear cooperation agreement between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union, whose approval would “pretty much be a slam dunk.” But bringing this agreement before Congress has drawbacks, the most important of which, is that it is sure to force a debate over Russia’s cooperation with Iran in the nuclear weapons and rocket fields. This is unlikely to make passage of START easier in the Senate.

If Obama stops pushing START, and the U.S. diversifies “arms-control portfolio to address nuclear threats outside” Russia , whose deployed nuclear capabilities have diminished in the last 25 years, we might make some headway, without letting Russia call the shots.

Will Obama be proactive and take the initiative in containing Russia , or will appeasement policies prevail?